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A STATE'S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ROLE:
FROM THE EARTH TO THE MOON
Stacey L. Lowder'
Since before the beginning of the space age, debate has existed re-
garding the legal status of terra nullius, that is, no man's land. With to-
day's advanced technology, the moon and other celestial bodies are easily
accessible. As territory belonging to no state, celestial bodies are compa-
rable to the New World. What is the law governing the moon and other
celestial bodies? Are they common heritage of mankind or can these be
claimed as sovereign territory by a state just as the New World was
claimed? What are the limits on states' utilization of outer space and ce-
lestial bodies? Where do those limits come from? Where does outer space
begin? These questions are addressed in the following text.
In Section I of this paper, the history of international space law will
be outlined. In Section II, explanation will be given of the nature of inter-
national space law, including the spatial classification of territory and
types of state jurisdiction. The purpose of this explanation is to provide a
foundation on which to address the idea of "common heritage of man-
kind." Section III provides a description of customary international law
and treaties governing the moon and other celestial bodies. The five trea-
ties and four resolutions governing the moon and other celestial bodies
are compared to the Antarctica Treaty. The legal status of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, will be explained in detail
in Section IV. The purpose of Section V is to present the controversial
issues of "where outer space begins" and the definition of "peaceful
uses." In conclusion, the paper will address the possible future issues re-
garding international space law.
I B.A. Oklahoma City University (1995); Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar (1997); J.D.
the University of Tulsa College of Law (1999).
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I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
A. Landmarks in the Development of International Space Law
Even before the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik 1 on
October 4, 1957, discussions were taking place regarding the legal per-
spective on access to and utilization of outer space. Prior to and during
the employment of artificial satellites by both the Soviet Union and the
United States, published works from different countries revealed an unfa-
vorable view of such activity.' Though unfavorable views existed, not a
single state questioned the legality of these activities.2 States began to
view uses of outer space in another context, specifically the legal impli-
cations of disarmament and arms control.3 As legal norms were concep-
tualized and developed, adverse views abated. The emphasis on security
issues promoted the objective of a shared, multinational right to access
outer space exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.4
From July 1, 1957, through December 31, 1958, over sixty-six coun-
tries gathered together for the International Geophysical Year (IGY), in
which representatives articulated their countries' hopes and expectations
regarding rights of access to outer space.' That conjoint endeavor re-
flected observations and input from over 30,000 scientists and technicians
for a period of eighteen months.6 The achievement of the IGY "consists
in its having secured the principle that orbiting satellites, as well as other
uses of space for nonharmful purposes, represents a lawful activity which
does not infringe upon any protected interests of states."7 This general
acceptance allowed states with space capabilities to advance these capa-
bilities and in doing so the legality of activities in space evolved. There-
fore, the development of the legal status of the use and enjoyment of
outer space can attribute its inception to the endeavors of the IGY.8
During the thirteenth session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, held at the end of 1958, further discussion took place regarding
the legality of outer space activities. 9 Although an absolute consensus
was not reached on every issue, states' views were established which
served as a basis for the development of future community policies re-
1. See MYERS S. McDoUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 204 (1963).
2. See iL at 203.
3. See id. at 204.
4. See id
5. See id. at 203.
6. See McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 203.
7. Id.
8. See id
9. See id. at 212.
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garding the policy of access to and enjoyment of outer space.'" Explora-
tion of space proceeded without opposition from any state. In the opinion
of an Italian representative, Professor Ambrosini, an apparent consent by
all states to space exploration amounted to a "tacit and unanimous agree-
ment obtained between these states in the sense of allowing, during the
geophysical year, the launching and circulation of rockets and artificial
satellites which practically overflew all the territories of various states
without any protest being made on the grounds of violation of sover-
eignty."11 Whether or not the space vehicles and artificial satellites actu-
ally entered a state's territory may be challenged, Professor Ambrosini
was correct in his assertion that the majority of states approved of the
activities.
The Geophysical Year provided an opportunity for exploration in
which states could test their limits. As exploration of space continued at
an unprecedented pace, IGY provided a forum for exploration of legal
implications of those activities. Because scientific advances were con-
tinually being made, new issues were being raised. The General Assem-
bly of the United Nations then contributed to the development of space
law by addressing those new issues. 2 As states with space capabilities
embarked on a new frontier, law was developed to govern this new field.
B. The United Nations and the Development of International Space Law
The work of the United Nations holds intrinsic importance in the
conception and the development of space law because it has served as the
main forum for the achievements of this branch of international law since
1945.13 While space activities occurred more often, agreements estab-
lishing a degree of consensus were achieved in United Nations delibera-
tions. 4 The General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) serves as the United Nations' official organ in
negotiating principles implemented in the five treaties on the law of outer
space and the four resolutions relevant to that law.15 These treaties and
resolutions cover issues of appropriation, peaceful use and exploration,
astronauts' activities, liability for damage caused by space objects, and
registration of space objects.
Resolutions are not law-making devices as are treaties, conventions
or declarations. Also, none of the five United Nations treaties relating to
outer space, in their capacity as treaties, affects the legal rights and duties
10. See id. at 213.
11. McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 207.
12. See id. at 212.
13. See BiN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 150 (1997).
14. See McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 212.
15. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 150.
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of non-parties. However, by way of Article 38 of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, a rule set forth in a treaty may become
binding upon a third state as a customary rule of international law. A rule
of customary international law is binding erga omnes; therefore, the trea-
ties set forth by the United Nations play a vital role in the development of
international space law governing all states. Similarly, a General Assem-
bly resolution may be given weight as a declaration of general principles
and would then bind all states.
II. NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
A. The Relevance of International Law
Space law is not a legal system independent from the law that gov-
erns on earth. 16 In the words of Professor Bin Cheng, space law is "a
functional classification of those rules of international law and of munici-
pal law relating to outer space, natural and man-made objects in outer
space, astronauts and man's activities in outer space or affecting outer
space."17 Since its beginning, international law has adhered to no intrinsic
geographical limits.
International space law, rather than domestic law, controls in the
matter of boundaries between airspace and outer space.'" Therefore, this
paper concentrates on international law. While states' autonomous do-
mestic laws have scientific and functional advantages, they only contrib-
ute insight to situations governed by international law.19 The binding, or
perhaps non-binding nature, of international law is important to under-
stand because it contributes to the development of space law.
B. The Nature of International Law
Because international law extends to outer space, it is necessary to
understand its nature. When discussing international law, the premises of
the discussion is lex lata, that is, the law as laid down, as distinguished
from lex ferenda, the law that is yet to be made." International law has
been defined as
the body of rules of conduct, enforceable by external sanction, which
confer rights and impose obligation primarily though not exclusively,
upon sovereign states and which owe their validity both to the consent
of states as expressed in custom and treaties and to the fact of the exis-
16. See id. at 429.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See generally id. at 429.
20. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 430.
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tence of an international community of states and individuals.
2 1
However, many elements of this definition are controversial and cannot
be considered as a correct representation of lex lata.22 Many of these ele-
ments fall into the category of lex ferenda, only representing ideas with-
out legal implications.
Carl Christol asserts that several factors contribute to the emergence
of international law regarding the space environment.23 Factors that con-
tribute to the progression of international law governing outer space in-
clude scientific and technological progress, legal and political clout, and
states' dissonant interests and values.24 These factors are subject to con-
stant change. In the midst of changing facts, needs, interests, and values,
focus must remain on lex lata and not lex ferenda, those philosophical
measures not yet recognized as law. The international legal system is
evolving and progressing in order to meet the changing needs of an inter-
national society, but weight can only be given to those laws that are es-
tablished. The term international law refers to an existing system of law
made of, by, and for subjects of international law.'
The international legal system comprises all norms having legal
force within the system.26 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice serves as an authoritative guide for recognizing the com-
ponent parts of international law.27 What the Statute of the International
Court of Justice Article 38(1)(c) calls "the general principles of law" are
those general principles of law found within every legal system by which
it is distinguished. 8 Article 38(l)(b) identifies another component as
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law."'29 These two components articulated in Articles 38(1)(c) and (b)
represent general international law.3" This group of rules, referred to as
general international law, consists of the rules of the international legal
system that are applicable erga omnes, that is, to all the subjects of inter-
national law, and that are generally accepted by those subjects as law.3'
21. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 9 (1970).
22. See id.
23. See CARL CRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 1-2 (1982).
24. See id
25. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 383-84.
26. See id at 175.
27. Bin Cheng, How Should We Study International Law, 13 Chinese Y.B. Int'l L. &
Affairs 223. (discussing I.C.J. Stat. art. 38(1)) (on file with author).
28. See id.
29. I.C.J. Stat. art. 38.
30. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 177. The term general international law is used here
synonymously with customary international law.
31. See id at 176.
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Another component of international law that is found in the Statute
of the International Court of Justice Article 38(1)(a) is "international
conventions., 32 According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Article 34, "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent. 33 In the same treaty, however, Arti-
cle 38 states that nothing precludes a rule established in a treaty from be-
coming binding on third parties as a rule of general international law. 4
When discussing international law, a clear distinction must be kept be-
tween those laws applicable erga omnes and those applicable only to par-
ties of a treaty. Also, one must remember that the Charter of the United
Nations has no legislative authority on non-contracting parties.35
In international law, subjects of international law are states and other
entities recognized by states as being endowed with international legal
personality. 36 Debate exists as to whether international law governs bod-
ies and persons other than states.37 Insofar as treaties are concerned, only
subjects of international law can enter into them, and as discussed above,
these treaties bind only treaty parties unless the treaty rules have become
rules of general international law.38 In the context of international space
law, the treaties governing outer space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, become binding on all states only when they have become
rules of general international law accepted by the generality of states.
C. The Extraterrestrial Application of International Law
Under general international law, there are few activities of states that
are either universally lawful or unlawful.39 Whether an act is lawful or
not, depends upon its locus, that is, the location where an activity took
place.' According to Black's Law Dictionary, territory is that "part of a
country separated from the rest and subject to a particular jurisdiction."'"
The spatial division of territories must be clear in order to determine the
legality of an act.
In the Palmas Island Arbitration (1928) between the Netherlands and
32. See I.C.J. Stat. art. 38. Conventions are also called treaties.




36. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 432.
37. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 21; see also REBECCA M.M. WALLACE,
INrERNATIONAL LAW 9 (3d. 1997) (asserting that states are no longer the exclusive subjects
of international law).
38. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 433.
39. See id at 387.
40. See id at 75.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1484 (7th ed. 1999).
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the United States, the sole arbitrator, Judge M. Huber, stated that territo-
rial sovereignty is the right of a state in regard to a portion of the globe
"to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a
State." 42 He went on to say that
the development of the national organization of States during the last
few centuries and, as a corollary, the development of international law,
have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the state
in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of
departure in settling most questLns that concern international
relations. 43
Referring to the law as it was at the time of the arbitration, Judge
Huber pointed out that the world was divided into three types of territo-
ries.' National territory is that over which a State exercises territorial
sovereignty to the exclusion of all others." Territorium extra commer-
cium is that which is not subject to national appropriation, but is open to
use by all. Literally, it is territory outside commerce, such as the high
seas.' 6 Territorium nullius is "territory without a sovereign recognized as
a subject of international law, and hence susceptible in law of being ac-
quired by a subject of international law."47 That is, territory not yet ap-
propriated to any state. International law now recognizes a fourth cate-
gory of territory called territorium commune humanitatis meaning terri-
tory that is "common heritage of mankind".48
While both territorium extra commercium and territorium commune
humanitatis cannot be territorially appropriated by any state, Professor
Cheng notes that "they differ in that the former is essentially a negative
concept, whereas the latter is a positive one. ' 49 Territorium extra com-
mercium allows individual states to exercise discretion regarding the
"administration, exploitation and use of natural resources of the territory
in question, while territorium commune humanitatis leaves such matters
to the discretion of the international community as a whole.""0
With the areas of the world classified, a determination and regulation
42. CHENG, supra note 13, at 385.
43. Id.
44. See id
45. See id. (quoting Judge Max Huber in the Palmas Island Arbitration that "territorial
sovereignty always belongs to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several States, to the
exclusion of all others").
46. See id at 386.
47. CHENG, supra note 13, at 1-iii.




TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
of actions of states can be reached. Professor Cheng asserts that "the
functional classification of activities of states into those that are lawful
and those that are unlawful follows-and not precedes-spatial delimita-
tion." An example asserted by Professor Cheng is that a state may or
may not arrest a foreign vessel for monitoring its electronic defense in-
stallations depending "not on the nature of the act but primarily on the
locus, of both the act and the arrest, i.e., whether the act of intelligence-
gathering and the arrest are carried out in a state's own territory, in the
territory of another State, on the high seas, in no man's land, or in an area
which is the 'common heritage of mankind'."52
During the Geophysical Year, countries throughout the world pro-
ceeded on the premise that the launching and flight of space vehicles was
allowed regardless of what territory they passed "over" during the course
of their flight.53 Professor McDougal asserts that "there may have been
initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally accepted rule to
the effect that, in principle, outer space is, on conditions of equality,
freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with existing
or future international law or agreements."' No state challenged the con-
clusion of the report given by the Ad Hoc Committee that outer space is
free under conditions of equality.5 5 These actions by states have contrib-
uted to the creation of the rules governing such actions.
D. Types and Elements of State Jurisdiction
In order to determine the legality of acts in different territories, an
understanding of the nature of state jurisdiction is necessary. In interna-
tional law, states are recognized as having three types of jurisdiction: that
over its own territory; that over its own ships, aircraft, and spacecraft; and
that over its own nationals, be they natural or legal persons.56
"Principles of jurisdiction determine: (a) a state's authority to adjudi-
cate within its own territorial boundaries; (b) a state's authority to estab-
lish norms of conduct applicable both inside and outside its borders; and
(c) a state's authority to exercise power to enforce its proscribed
norms."57 Jurisdiction can be divided into three types: territorial jurisdic-
tion, personal jurisdiction, and quasi-territorial jurisdiction, and into two
elements described by Professor Cheng as jurisfaction and jurisaction.58
51. Id. at 387.
52. CHENG, supra note 13, at 387.
53. See MCDoUGAL, supra note 1, at 203.
54. Id. at211.
55. See id
56. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 387.
57. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL, 159 (2d. ed. 1990).
58. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 72.
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The American Law Institute adopted in its Second Edition of Restatement
of the Law a similar distinction between jurisdiction to prescribe norms of
conduct and jurisdiction to enforce the prescribed norms.59 Professor
Cheng asserts that jurisfaction "covers more than merely jurisdiction to
legislate, and jurisaction more than mere law enforcement." The Third
Edition of Restatement of the Law has since reverted to a tripartite divi-
sion of jurisdictions to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce.6 The
schematic classification set forward by Professor Cheng is helpful in un-
derstanding territorial jurisdiction as a whole.
Territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and quasi-territorial
jurisdiction should be distinguished. Territorial jurisdiction is the sum
total of the powers of a state in respect of terra firma under its govern-
mental authority, including all persons and things therein, and the extra-
territorial activities of such persons.62 Such power is derived from territo-
rial sovereignty or may be derived from treaties, peaceful occupation, or
even belligerent occupation.
Personal jurisdiction is "the sum total of the powers of a state in re-
spect of individuals or corporate bodies or business enterprises having its
nationality or otherwise enjoying its protection or owing it allegiance,
wherever they may be.
' 63
Quasi-territorial jurisdiction comes between territorial jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. It is the sum total of the powers of a state in re-
spect of ships, aircraft and spacecraft (to the extent to which they are
also granted legal personality) having its nationality or registration....
but also to all persons and things on board, including the activities of
such persons, whether on board the craft or elsewhere.
64
Jurisfaction, the normative element, represents the power of a state to
adopt binding legal norms and to apply them with binding effect through
its appropriate organs.65 Jurisaction, the physical element, is the power of
a state, at any given time or place, physically to perform any govern-
mental function, be it the act of actually making, applying, implementing
or enforcing laws. Professor Cheng explains that this includes "holding a
legislative assembly, conducting an administrative inquiry, setting up a
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
17-20 (1965) (cited in BUERGENTHAL supra note 56, at 159.)
60. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 72.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401 (1965) (cited in BIJERGENTHAL supra note 56, at 159.)
62. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 72.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 73.
65. See itl
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tribunal, or arresting a wanted person. '
A state's personal jurisfaction over its nationals is limitless in its
geographical scope, but such enacted laws may not be enforced while its
nationals are in a foreign country because such person is under the territo-
rial jurisaction of another state.67 A hierarchy exists: territorial jurisaction
prevails over all, and quasi-territorial prevails over personal jurisaction. 6
This means that a state may, in its own territory, pass laws applicable to
its own nationals who are in foreign countries and try them in absentia,
but it may not send its officers to where they are in order to arrest them.69
International law restricts any attempt to exercise personal jurisaction at a
place, which is subject to the territorial or quasi-territorial jurisaction of
another state.70
Therefore, it is apparent that the legality of acts depends on their lo-
cus, as well as their nature and the person by whom they are carried out.71
In order to reach an understanding of law governing res nullius, it is im-
portant to understand state jurisdiction. The absence of territorial sover-
eignty in res nullius does not prohibit a state from exercising either its
personal or quasi-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals, ships, aircraft
or spacecraft.72 The absence of territorial sovereignty only means that
territorial jurisaction can not be exercised in terra nullius.
7 3
The distinction between jurisfaction and jurisaction is necessary in
order to understand the consequences of the judgment of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in The S.S. Lotus Case.7 4 In that de-
cision, the court rejected the territoriality of criminal law as a binding rule
of international law and affirmed, in effect, the universal scope of territo-
rial jursfaction and the overriding character of territorial jurisaction.75 The
PCIJ stated that states have a wide measure of discretion
in application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to per-
sons, property, and acts outside their territory. States' discretion is only
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; in regards to other cases,
every state remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best
and most suitable. All that can be required of a state is that it should not
overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction;
66. Id.




71. See id at 75.
72. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 79.
73. See id at 74.




within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sover-
eignty.
76
III. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
A. The Formation and Emergence of Rules of International Law
General international law is created when consent is given by the
generality of states that a given rule is a rule of international law with
application to all subjects of the legal system.77 This general acceptance
may be labeled opinio generalis juris generalis.78 Article 38(1)(b) of the
ICJ Statue speaks of "international custom, a general practice accepted as
law."79 International law is not applied to states by a governing authority-
it is founded on acceptance by states.80
The material element of "custom" has been much debated. Professor
Cheng asserts that custom differs in importance in the international legal
system as it does in a municipal system. 8' What in municipal law is an
indispensable constituent element serves, in general international law, as
evidence of a legal norm.82 This is articulated in Article 38(l)(b) of the
International Court's Statute.83 Usage or State practice in the ascertain-
ment of rules of general international law is the means of establishing the
existence of a rule.' A rule exists even when it is not used, so general
acceptance of a rule is significant. 85 Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice speaks of "judicial decisions and teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.",
86
Professor Cheng asserts that the term "custom" does not require
prolonged usage as such, but can be instant.87 Professor Rebecca Wallace
also asserts that "custom must be distinguished from mere usage."88 She
explains that a state may act a certain way only out of "courtesy, friend-
76. The S.S. Lotus, supra note 74, at 18.
77. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 179.
78. See id at 180. Professor Cheng defines opinio generalis juris generalis as "a general
opinio juris among the subjects of international law that the rule is one of general interna-
tional law." Id. at 1.
79. I.C.J. Stat. art. 38.
80. See WALLACE, supra note 37, at 3.
81. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 180.
82. See id.
83. See I.C.J. Stat. art. 38
84. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 180.
85. See id. at 181.
86. I.C.J. Stat. art. 38 (emphasis added).
87. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 191.
88. WALLACE, supra note 37, at 9.
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ship, or convenience", rather than out of consent to a legal obligation.89
Rules of custom consist of two elements: material and psychological.' °
The material element is a state's behavior and practice; the psychological
element is the conviction held by a state that its behavior is mandatory.91
Professor Cheng asserts that it is not a legal duty that exists, rather it is a
state's acceptance of a given rule as a rule of international law and that
rule is invocable against that state.' Much debate continues regarding the
definition of the psychological element of "custom." Therefore, careful
attention must be given states' acceptance of legal norms in order to de-
termine those legal rights and duties that are applicable to all states.
B. The Relationship Between General International Law and Treaties
As previously discussed, treaties are binding only on contracting
parties, unless the rules they incorporate have become rules of general
international law. It is important to keep in mind that only treaty parties
are bound by treaty provisions. Whether the metamorphosis of treaty pro-
visions into rules of general international law will occur depends on the
attitude of states.93 Treaty provisions are transformed into rules of general
international law whenever a provision becomes opinio generalis juris
generalis.' The only requirement is the acceptance of a rule as one of
general international law by the dominant section of that particular sub-
ject, whether or not contracting parties.95 There is debate as to whether
acceptance is required only from the dominant section, or from the inter-
national community as a whole.
In the creation of rules of general international law, assertions have
been made that the weight of states is not equal and that unanimity is not
required.96 In order for a given norm to be pronounced a rule of general
international law, acceptance by the preponderant weight of states is req-
uisite.97 Calculation of the weight of different states varies with the sub-
ject matter, the context, and the circumstances.98 It is important to recog-
nize that this difference does exist and may legitimately be taken into
account, although it undermines the concept of sovereign equality.' Be-




92. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 1-1ii.
93. See id. at 190.
94. See id at 191.
95. See id
96. See id at 190.





governing society, it is understandable that the dominant section plays
such a controlling role.l0°
One may conclude that all the five treaties relating to outer space,
signed by the dominant space powers, may all become rules of general
international law. This conclusion can be refuted by the fact that all five
treaties contain a withdrawal clause permitting the contracting states to
withdraw from the treaty by written notice.' 1 The effect of a withdrawal
clause is defeated when a state remains bound by its provisions on ac-
count of their having become rules of general international law. 07 While
debate exists regarding the extent to which the dominant section controls,
it is well established that the generality of states must recognize the treaty
provisions as expressions of general international law in order for those
provisions to bind third states. 03 Before that recognition, the treaty provi-
sions are only binding on the state parties and are not binding erga om-
nes.1° With this in mind, the provisions of the following treaties will be
closely examined.
1. Antarctica Treaty
The legal status of Antarctica is a relatively recent example of terri-
torium nullius becoming territorium extra commercium. Accordingly, a
background of Antarctica will be helpful to understand its legal status.
Antarctica was discovered in the early 1800's.15 The first known
landing was made on February 7, 1821, by an American sealer."° Yet, it
was not until the 1840's the Antarctica was established as a continent. 7
In the 1900's, seven countries, known as "claimant states" made
claims of sovereignty over Antarctica. 8 These countries based their
claims on a diverse assortment of theories, including the well-worn doc-
trine of "discovery" or "exploration," as well as "contiguity" or proximity
to the Antarctic landmass."'9 After World War II another group of five
countries-all with extensive contacts to the continent-asserted that
they would neither maintain nor acknowledge any territorial claims to
100. See id. at 191.
101. See id.
102. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 191.
103. See id
104. See id.
105. "Antarctic," Microsoft Encarta 98 Encyclopedia (1993-1997).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. GuRuswAMy & HENDERSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NuT SHELL,
172-73 (1997). These "claimant states" are the United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand
(1923), Australia (1933), France (1938), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942).
109. Id. at 172.
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Antarctica. They became known as the 'nonclaimant states.""'"
The Antarctic Treaty was concluded in 1959, freezing for thirty years
all territorial claims to Antarctica and dedicating the entire continent to
peaceful scientific investigation. The treaty came into effect in 1961 and
"in 1991, 24 nations approved a protocol to the treaty that would ban oil
and other mineral exploration for at least 50 years.111 The Antarctic
Treaty set precedent for other areas not appropriated to any state. While
the Treaty is only binding on state parties, its provisions have become
rules of general international law that are binding on all states.
2. Four Resolutions and Five Treaties on Outer Void Space and
Celestial Bodies
Since the beginning of international space law development, debate
has existed within COPUOS as to the best method to establish such law.
The Soviet Union favored a treaty method because only States who had
given their consent would be bound. The United States, however, who
commanded a two-thirds majority in the United Nations, insisted on a
resolution rather than a treaty.
Resolutions lack legally binding force, but have beneficial charac-
teristics of simplicity and flexibility. Resolutions can be adopted, imple-
mented and changed without delay, requiring approval from only a two-
thirds majority. The disadvantage of resolutions is that they offer no re-
course because they are not binding, with the exception of matters con-
cerning the budget and procedure.
Treaties are legally binding on the parties to the agreement, which
allows the establishment of a legal framework. The problem with treaties
is that they may take a long time for parties to come to agreement. As
will be seen below, after five treaties were drawn up, COPUOS returned
to the previous method of elaborating principles in resolutions, as seen in
Resolution 37/92 of December 10, 1982 on Principles Governing the Use
by States of Artificial Satellites for International Direct Television
Broadcasting. This exemplifies the difficulty that can be encountered
with treaties." 2
Resolution 1721 (XVI) of December 20, 1961 "commends" states to
use outer space for exploration in conformity with international law and
not subject celestial bodies to national appropriation. "' At the time of the
resolution, 1961, outer void space, not being terra firma, was probably
110. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. This group consisted of Bel-
gium, Japan, South Africa, the U.S.S.R. and the United States.
111. GURUSWAMY & HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 172.
112. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 154.
113. See Resolution 1721 (XVI) of December 20, 1961, G.A. Res. 1721 (cited in CHENG,
supra note 13, at 735).
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already considered an international law res extra commercium not subject
to national appropriation." 4 Celestial bodies, however, being terrae fir-
mae, could legitimately be considered as international res nullius suscep-
tible of being appropriated to a state through effective occupation." 5
While this resolution did not change international law, it played political
importance in the development of the legal status of outer space and es-
pecially celestial bodies." 6
Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of October 17, 1963 calls for all states to
declare their intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." 7 Reso-
lution 1962 (XVIII) of December 13, 1963 represents an understanding
between the Soviet Union and the United States that ground rules would
be observed in the exploration and use of outer space." 8
Resolution 37/92 of December 10, 1982 on Principles Governing the
Use by States of Artificial Satellites for International Direct Television
Broadcasting (DBS resolution) was written after a gap of nineteen years
since the previous resolution. 9 During that period the United Nations
proceeded by way of treaties in its development of international space
law; therefore, the DBS resolution represents a return to the previous
method of elaborating principles by way of resolution, rather than
treaty. 20 These resolutions, although not legally binding, were significant
contributions in the development of international space law.
The five United Nations treaties so far adopted contributing to the
development of international space law have all come into force.12' Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
January 27, 1967 (1967 Space Treaty) is the first and the most important
of the treaties.'22 The driving force behind the conclusion of this treaty
was the successful landing by the Soviet Union's Luna IX on the moon
114. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 152.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of October 17, 1963 (cited in CHENG, supra note 13, at
736).
118. See Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 13, 1963 (cited in CHENG, supra note 13, at
736).
119. See Resolution 37/92 of December 10, 1982 on Principles Governing the Use by
States of Artificial Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (cited in
CHENG, supra note 13, at 738). [hereinafter DBS resolution].
120. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 154.
121. See id. at 155.
122. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Outer Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, 21 O.O.S.A.
(Office for Outer Space Affairs) 2222. [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
1999]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
on February 3, 1966.123 The United States was set on achieving a treaty
through the United Nations that would restrict exploration of outer space
to peaceful purposes only and would prevent any nation from claiming
sovereignty over any celestial bodies. 24
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts,
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968
(Astronauts Agreement) was a response to fatalities that occurred in
space exploration."2 On January 27, 1967 three United States astronauts
died before take-off due to a fire that broke out on board Apollo 1.126
Shortly thereafter, a Soviet died in Soyuz I when landing. 127 The United
Nations General Assembly requested that COPUOS prepare "an agree-
ment on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles."
128
The Astronauts Agreement calls on States to notify both the launch-
ing authority and the Secretary-General of the United Nations if it is dis-
covered that an astronaut or a space object made an emergency landing in
territory under their jurisdiction or in any place not under the jurisdiction
of any state. 29 If within their territory, states are to undertake to search,
rescue, and return the astronaut unconditionally and if outside the terri-
tory, render such other assistance that they can.1
30
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, March 29, 1972 was achieved after nine years of discussion.' 3'
States, especially without advanced space technology, were concerned
about the danger of space objects falling within their country and causing
personal injuries or material damage. 3 2 The convention is well drafted
and provides more information than Article VII of the 1967 Space
Treaty.'33 The Convention clearly defines the conditions in which a
launching State or inter-governmental organization becomes liable, es-
tablishes the procedure for the presentation of claims, and provides means
for resolving disputes regarding the settlement of claims. 34
123. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 156.
124. See id
125. See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, O.O.S.A. 2345. [hereinafter Astro-
nauts Agreement].





131. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
March 29, 1972, O.O.S.A. [hereinafter Convention on International Liability],
132. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 158.
133. See id.
134. See Convention on International Liability, supra note 126.
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Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
January 14, 1975 provides for the identification of space objects and the
entities that launch them, which are important pieces of information when
determining liability for damages which occur."' Identification of space
objects is dependent upon knowledge and ability to track the basic orbital
parameter of objects launched into space.136 From the legal standpoint,
"space object" is the generic term used to cover space craft, satellites, and
anything that human beings launch or attempt to launch into space, in-
cluding their components and launch vehicles, as well as parts thereof.
137
The required registration will help facilitate identification of space ob-
jects and communication between states concerning such space objects.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, December 18, 1979 (1979 Moon Treaty) reflects the
wishes of non-space developing countries.'38 The idea of 'a common
heritage of mankind' which was first introduced in reference to the sea-
bed and ocean floor, is expressed in the Moon Treaty. 39 States without
advanced space capabilities want to ensure that the uses of outer space
will be exclusively for peaceful purposes and will benefit all peoples. The
prime objective of developing countries has been secured in the wording
of the Moon Treaty, but no space power of any significance has ratified
the treaty. "
Each treaty discussed above has considerably contributed to the for-
mation of rules of general international law. The five treaties and the four
resolutions governing outer space and celestial bodies, and the Antarctic
Treaty are only binding on their state parties. But it is evident that be-
cause of the way in which general international law works, these treaties
carry weight to all states.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF OUTER SPACE AND OF CELESTIAL BODIES
The legal categorization of territories under general international law
has been discussed above. The differences between categorizations of
national territory, territorium extra commercium, territorium nullius, and
"common heritage of mankind" have been explained in detail. It is now
necessary to determine which of these categories includes outer space,
135. See Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, January 14,
1975, O.O.S.A.
136. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 159.
137. See id. at 462 ("space vehicle").
138. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, December 18, 1979, O.O.S.A. [hereinafter 1979 Moon Treaty]
139. See id
140. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 161.
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including the moon and other celestial bodies. This determination is made
by looking at general international law as well as treaties that have come
into force and whether these treaties have metamorphosed into general
international law, binding erga omnes.
A. Outer Space and Celestial Bodies under General International Law
At the initial stage of the space age, celestial bodies, including the
moon, being terrae firmae and no different from the so called "New
World" when Christopher Columbus landed, were territorium nullius
capable of being lawfully occupied by States.'4 ' This position has
changed since the beginning of the space age because of treaties. Two
multilateral treaties, both drafted by the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, specifically deal with the legal status of
outer space and celestial bodies: the 1967 Space Treaty and the 1979
Moon Treaty. The rule incorporated in Article II of the 1967 Space
Treaty that outer space, including the moon and celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation can probably be regarded as having be-
come a rule of general international law. Outer void space, not being ter-
rae firmae, has from the very beginning, not been subject to national ap-
propriation under general international law. 42
B. Outer Space and Celestial Bodies under the 1967 Space Treaty
The 1967 Space Treaty provides in its Article III:
States' Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and celestial bodies, in ac-
cordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security
and promoting international co-operation and understanding.
143
Article III affirms that international law has to be complied with by
state parties to the Treaty in their activities in outer space and on celestial
bodies and includes the Charter of the United Nations under the umbrella
of international law. "4 It has already been stated that treaties cannot be
binding on third parties; therefore the Charter cannot be considered
binding erga omnes, unless its provisions have by general consent ac-
quired the force of general international law.'45 However, by way of Arti-
cle III, parties of the 1967 Space Treaty, which are not members of the
141. See id. at 390.
142. See id. at 525.
143. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 122, at art. Ill.
144. See id.
145. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 399.
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United Nations, have thereby consented to be bound by the Charter inso-
far as their activities in outer space are concemed."4
There is controversy as to the meaning of the latter part of Article
MII.147 The article may be understood to require state parties to always act
in the interest of maintaining peace and security and promoting coopera-
tion and understanding in the international community.'" Secondly, Arti-
cle I may be only an explanation of the need for states parties to comply
with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. 49 A third
interpretation may be that the Charter of the United Nations has to be
complied with only to the extent that it affects peace, security and co-
operation among the international community." ° Article III does not in-
crease the obligations of the contracting parties under general interna-
tional law and under treaties to which they are already parties. 1 '
Article II of the 1967 Space Treaty states "[o]uter space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means."' 2 It has transformed the legal status of the moon and other
celestial bodies from res nullius (their status under general international
law) to res extra commercium.153 As far as outer void space is concerned,
Article II has merely confirmed its legal status under general international
law. " The concept of non-appropriation as applied to the high seas is
embodied in Article 11.155 According to this article, no contracting state
will be entitled to exercise territorial jurisdiction over any part of outer
space or of celestial bodies. 156 However, types of state jurisdiction do ap-
ply in outer space, just as on the high seas. Otherwise, this would be an
area of lawlessness. 
157
Customary international law has now accepted the principle set forth
in the 1967 Space Treaty that outer space and celestial bodies are not
subject to national appropriation.'58 However, the appropriation of the
natural resources thereof is another matter. 59 Such appropriation of natu-
146. See id.
147. See id
148. See id at 400.
149. See id.
150. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 400.
151. See id
152. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 122, at art. II.
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ral resources falls within the freedom of exploration and use that is al-
lowed under the Treaty. 60
The underlying concept of the Treaty follows that of general interna-
tional law as it is stated in its Preamble: the belief that "the exploration
and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples
irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development.'
' 61
This intention has been carried further in the 1979 Moon Treaty.
C. Outer Space and Celestial Bodies under the 1979 Moon Treaty
The 1979 Moon Treaty is recognized as the first legal recognition of
territory belonging to the "common heritage of mankind." The territory
includes the moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, ex-
cept the earth, and all their natural resources. 62 This concept, however,
was not achieved easily.
The concept of "common heritage of mankind" began in 1967 when
Mr. Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations, intro-
duced the concept that the sea-bed and ocean floor, beyond the limits of
present national jurisdiction, should be declared "a common heritage of
mankind", which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
administered by an international authority for the benefit of all peoples.'63
The concept was quickly seized upon by those interested in the develop-
ment of international space law."6
Two forces were at work in the development of the 1979 Moon
Treaty. The non-space developing countries wanted primarily to have the
new concept of the "common heritage of mankind" accepted in a legally
binding document. 65 Opposing such an idea was the Soviet Union and
the United States, the two space powers."6 The end result was that both
sides could claim success in regard to their respective objectives.'67 How-
ever, developing states probably achieved only a label, rather than a le-
gally binding rule. 168 The United States exemplifies the little weight given
to the language, by maintaining its assertion that the 1979 Moon Treaty
does not establish a moratorium on exploitation. "6 Additionally, the non-
space developing countries cannot give too much credit to the 1979 Moon
160. See id
161. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 122, preamble.
162. See id at art. 1(1).
163. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 160.
164. See id.
165. See id at 161.
166. See id.
167. See id




Treaty because no space power has yet ratified the treaty. 70
V. THE DIVISION BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE
When discussing the legal status of outer space, one must ask where
does outer space begin and what exactly is outer space? 7' As it stands,
there is no answer that is accepted by all states. Professor McDougal
points out that the most striking feature of outer space is "its vastness,
indeed, its boundlessness."'7 Several approaches are taken in delimiting
airspace and outer space.
Some experts have described the gradual merging of atmosphere into
space in empirical terms. '73 Moving from the earth outward, five layers of
atmosphere are encountered, with the upper limit somewhere about 1000
miles above the earth.'74 The problem with these boundaries is that they
are imprecise and shift from place to place and from time to time."'
Another approach has been to emphasize the potentiality of unpro-
tected human access where man can no longer obtain a sufficient amount
of oxygen by breathing air. 176 Others have considered space to begin at
the point where the atmosphere is reduced to one per cent, which is ap-
proximately 20 miles above the earth. 77 Another option is to draw a line
on the basis of the "material limit" of the earth's atmosphere, that is,
along the level where collisions between the air particles are extremely
rare. 78 This would mean outer space begins at approximately 600 miles
above the earth's surface.1'1 It is obvious that arriving at an all-purpose
definition of "outer space" is difficult. Different sciences with different
approaches lead to different results. Further, with the development of
technology, change is seen even in the results.
However, there is a more popular view that is most helpful in deter-
mining the legal status of "outer space." The line of demarcation has been
considered to be the altitude at which an artificial satellite comes closest
to the earth in its orbit, that is, the perigee."8 A number of spacecraft,
both manned and unmanned, had a perigee of approximately 100 miles. 8 '
170. See id.
171. See McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 33.
172. Id. at 32.
173. See id at 33.
174. See id
175. See id.
176. See McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 33.
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It appears that the altitude of about 100 miles above surface can be con-
sidered an artificial satellites' lowest possible point before it will burn
up.182 Since Sputnik I first went into orbit on October 4, 1957, the lowest
perigee achieved so far has been at 96 kilometers, and the next lowest at
104 kilometers. 83 All other satellites have perigees above the 110 kilo-
meter line. Therefore, it has been asserted that at 96 kilometers one is
definitely in outer space. And if not at 96 kilometers, then definitely at
110 kilometers."8 The speculation as to where airspace sovereignty ends
and where outer space begins is still debated, but most states accept this
line of reasoning as lex lata.
VI. "PEACEFUL USES" OF OUTER SPACE AND CELESTIAL BODIES
A. Uses under General International Law
As law governing outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies
has developed, the determination of the extent of utilization has been de-
bated. Before the existence of the 1967 Space Treaty, no specific guide-
lines relating to the military use of outer space, the moon and other celes-
tial bodies existed. Only the rules of general international law that govern
areas of res extra commercium or res nullius were applicable.85 Military
use was allowed only with observance of general international law.'86
The definition of "peaceful" has been an issue much debated. Profes-
sor Christol explained that the expression "peaceful purposes" is a legal
term of ar187 The term has been discussed mostly regarding its use in
Article IV(2) of the 1967 Space Treaty and in Article 3(a) of the 1979
Moon Treaty.188 The expectation of exclusive use for peaceful purposes
has been applied to all spatial areas--outer void space, the moon, and
other celestial bodies. 89
At the beginning of the space age several views were adduced in de-
fining "peaceful purposes.'" While both of the dominant space powers
asserted from the inception of the space age that outer space and celestial
bodies should be used only for genuinely peaceful purposes and the
common benefit of mankind, no single definition of "peaceful purposes"
was agreed upon. 9'
182. See id at 33.
183. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 451.
184. See id
185. See id at 513.
186. See id.
187. See CHRISTOL, supra note 23, at 22.
188. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 513.
189. See CHRISTOL, supra note 23, at 22.
190. See id.
191. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 514.
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The proposals regarding "peaceful purposes" began in the field of
nuclear energy as seen in the 1946 United States Atoms for Peace Plan."9
A little over a decade later, the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPOUS) were created. Also during this period, many resolutions re-
garding the "peaceful uses of outer space" were passed by the General
Assembly, such as Resolution 1148 (XII) that asserted the concept of
sending objects through outer space eclusively for peaceful and scientific
purposes.'93
The mindset of the times must be regarded as a factor contributing to
the move towards "peace." During this period was the beginning of a
movement in which "peaceful" was adopted as a fashionable term. People
were speaking of world peace, rather than war."9 It was during the time
of this movement that the United States adopted the National Aeronautics
and Space Act creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA). 9 The 1958 act provided that "the Congress declares that it
is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be de-
voted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind." "% The Soviet
Union took actions that were given the popular label of "peace" as well.
Exemplifying such custom is the fact that the Soviet Ambassador to the
United Kingdom ordered, for the ambassadorial country residence, 100
rose bushes of the variety "Peace"."7 The prevailing popular custom of
"peace" was the new trend.
While talk of "peace" increased, so did the military potential of space
technology. With this in mind, the United States interpretation of the
word "peaceful" was created.19 The official position of the United States
has been and still remains that "peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and
not "non-military."' 99 The Soviet Union held an opposite view that mili-
tary activities in the space environment cannot be and are not peaceful.2"
The Soviet proposal, banning use of outer space for military purposes,
equated peaceful use with non-military use. 21' The United States rejected
the Soviet Union's proposal because it included a ban on overseas mili-
tary bases.2 2
192. See id.
193. See CHRISTOL, supra note 23, at 23.
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On November 13, 1958 the United States proposed that the United
Nations establish a committee to promote international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space.0 3 Much support was given to this widely
based appeal.2' However, it was the last time that the General Assembly
gave formal approval to such appeal because no agreement could be
reached among states. 5 All proposals were referred to the First Com-
mittee of the United Nations in the form of a draft, which was approved
fifty-four to nine, with eighteen abstentions. 6 The Soviet bloc states
contributed the negative votes and announced a boycott of the new
United Nations Outer Space Committee because it did not take into ac-
count its proposal of banning overseas military bases.20 7 On December
13, 1958, the General Assembly adopted the report of the First Commit-
tee, stressing the need for "international and scientific cooperation in the
peaceful uses of outer space.""
Throughout the discussion of how outer space ought to be used, no
agreement was reached on what the term "peaceful" really meant. 2°9 With
the reality of military activities in outer space, states continued to assert
their respective views of "peaceful purposes."2 ' Senator Al Gore, repre-
senting the United States, stated before the First Committee of the United
Nations on December 3, 1962:
[ilt is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only
for peaceful-that is, non-aggressive and beneficial-purposes. The
question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the
question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both
environments we must continue our efforts for general and complete dis-
armament with adequate safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of
any space activities must not be whether it is military or non-military,
but whether or not it is jnsistent with the United Nations Charter and
other obligations of law.2
As a member of the United Nations, the United States was willing to
abide by Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which requires
that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."2 2 However, the United States asserted the fact
203. See id
204. See id
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that no legal constraints exist in general international law or even the
Charter of the United Nations that oblige states not to use outer space for
military purposes."'
Several assertions can be made in defense of the United States' posi-
tion. One argument is that "military" activities cannot be separated from
"non-military" activities.2"4 The opposite view, however, is that likewise
there is no recognizable distinction between "aggressive" and "non-
aggressive" space activities. 2 5 Also, while the United States asserts in its
National Aeronautic and Space Act that activities in space should be de-
voted to peaceful purposes, it does not specify that those purposes are
exclusive.1 6 The Act places no legal limitation on the United States' ac-
tivities in space: it merely states a general objective of the United States
in its activities internationally as well as domestically.217 The use of the
word "non-aggressive" rather than "non-military" activities may be justi-
fied on grounds that the military can be used in a non-aggressive manner
in maintaining peace. The United States justified military activities as
peaceful because they had a peaceful intent and made arms control possi-
ble by assuring both the United States and the Soviet Union of the ability
to observe what the other was doing in a way not before possible.2 8
While both the United States and the Soviet Union both continued to de-
fend their positions, the truth of the matter was that neither country
wanted a final definition to be accepted by all states.219 Such an ultimate
conclusion would limit both countries' future use of outer space. As P.K.
Menon stated, "[s]ince an all-pervasive, acceptable, objective criteria de-
fining peaceful uses have never been devised, the conclusion that a par-
ticular activity is peaceful is always a subjective determination and there-
fore apt to reflect the self interests of the party making the determina-
tion.,
220
Nothing in general international law or in the Charter of the United
Nations obligates states to refrain from using outer space for military
purposes. It is now established that general international law regards
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, as open to use
by all states and their nationals.221 States must refrain from interfering
213. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 515.
214. See id
215. See id at 516.
216. See id
217. See id
218. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 516.
219. See id
220. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMs RACE IN OUTER
SPACE ch. 3 (1988).
221. See id
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with other states' use.222 Other than that, there are no specific restrictions
on military use in peacetime. 23 Additionally, there are no developed re-
strictions of military use during times of war or armed conflict. 24 Re-
strictions on military use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, are found only in treaties.
B. Uses under the 1967 Moon Treaty
It must be remembered that treaties are only binding on state parties.
However, if such treaties are declaratory of general international law or
provisions of the treaty have become rules of general international law
through general acceptance, then as general international law, it is bind-
ing erga omnes. Article IV of the Space Treaty reads: "[s]tates' Parties to
the Treaty undertake not place in orbit around the earth any objects car-
rying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner, 225
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of
military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of
weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research
or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of
any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the
moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
226
Several points must be made regarding the textual language of the
1967 Space Treaty Article IV. The Treaty constantly uses the expression,
"outer space, including the moon and celestial bodies."227 Therefore,
when the Treaty is referring to the moon and celestial bodies, it makes
specific reference. It would follow that Article IV(2), which refers to
utilization of "the moon and other celestial bodies" for exclusive "peace-
ful purposes," does not apply to outer void space. 2 ' There is no mention
of the use of the void between celestial bodies. Therefore, it can be de-
duced that the 1967 Space Treaty has not reserved outer space as a whole
for use exclusively for peaceful purposes.229
222. See id.
223. CHENG, supra note 13, at 525.
224. See id.
225. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 122, at art. IV.
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Opinions differ regarding interpretation of Article IV(2). Professor
Cheng cites the importance of the interpretation in the fact that "depend-
ing on the interpretation one chooses, even if the word 'peaceful' is inter-
preted as meaning 'non-military,' the construction, for instance, of a mine
on the moon ... for the excavation of valuable minerals for the manu-
facture of space weapons . . . could be regarded as either prohibited or
allowed." '230
Debate during the negotiations of the 1967 Space Treaty embraced
the nature of military use for peaceful purposes."' Those who interpreting
"peaceful" as "non-military" pointed to the traditional use of the term as
exemplified in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.232 The United States, however,
maintained its "non-aggressive" interpretation, as it did under general
international law. 233 A participant in the negotiations wrote:
[d]uring the drafting of the [1967 Space] Treaty, the Indian delegation
proposed an amendment to confirm that the parties to the Treaty (or all
states) undertake to use outer space and the celestial bodies exclusively
for peaceful purposes. Brazil, Mexico and some other delegations gave
some support to this principle. But the Indian amendment was not gen-
erally acceptable. However much one may regret it, it is difficult to
foresee any general acceptance, in the context of wider measures of
disarmament, or a reservation of outer space for peaceful purposes,
whatever that may mean, if the attempt was to exclude all use for de-
fense purposes.234
Only aggressive military conduct is considered outside the peaceful
purposes requirement of the 1967 Space Treaty.235 Therefore, military
activities for beneficial and peaceful purposes would not be in violation
of Article IV(2).236
It is well established that the only specific limitation placed on the
use of the outer void space for military purposes is that found in Article
IV(1). 2 37 The language specifically refers to the limitation of nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction from being
placed "in orbit around the earth . . . install on celestial bodies . . . nor
station in outer space in any manner.2 13' This language refers to nuclear
230. Id.
231. See id
232. See id. at 529.
233. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 529.
234. H. G. Darwin, The Outer Space Treaty, 42 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 278 (1967).
235. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 529.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 122, at art. IV.
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weapons and other weapons of mass destruction specifically and not to
peaceful purposes generally. Because the article specifically mentions
celestial bodies, the language "in outer space in any manner" appears to
include outer void space. Professor Cheng asserts that "the outer void
space as such can be used for any military activity that is compatible with
general international law and the Charter of the United Nations, so long
as no "nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction
are stationed there.,
239
An interpretation of the words "any other kind of weapons of mass
destruction" has produced the idea that the 1967 Space Treaty does not
mean nuclear weapons as such, but only nuclear weapons that cause
"mass destruction." 2" Provided, therefore, that they do not cause mass
destruction, whatever that may be interpreted to mean, an argument may
be made that the stationing in outer void space of nuclear weapons with-
out the capability of mass destruction would be allowed under the provi-
sions of the treaty.2" However, this argument lacks merit because of the
express wording of the Treaty.1 2 A stronger argument may be that such
an interpretation does not preclude the stationing in outer void space of
nuclear powered weapons, such as X-ray lasers, provided that they are
not capable of mass destruction.
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Even more important than the effect of the suggested interpretation,
"it should be pointed out that what the parties have agreed to refrain from
in Article IV(l) is simply to station such weapons in outer space, includ-
ing celestial bodies." 2 'They have not agreed to refrain from either (a)
using any kind of weapon in outer void space, or (b) sending any kind of
weapon to their target through outer void space."' 21 Professor Cheng fur-
ther points out that
whilst the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space is
prohibited by the 1967 Space Treaty, nothing prevents the stationing of
such weapons in a State's own territory, including its national airspace,
provided they are not in earth orbit. Since there is no agreed delimita-
tion of the boundary between national airspace and outer space... this
can be an added source of conflict.
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Only parties to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would not be exempt
239. CHENG, supra note 13, at 529.
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from the suggested loopholes. 2 47
In summary, it can be seen that the adoption of the "non-military"
interpretation of the word "peaceful" in Article IV of the 1967 Space
Treaty, contracting parties will remain free to use outer void space for
military purposes in accordance with general international law.' Only
the stationing in outer void space of weapons of mass destruction is pro-
hibited. Under the "non-military" interpretation of the word "peaceful,"
however, the moon and other celestial bodies must be completely de-
militarized.249 Professor Cheng asserts that the "only real restrictions un-
der that interpretation are the establishment of military bases, installation,
testing of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial
bodies other than the moon and the earth."" 5
C. Uses under the 1979 Moon Treaty
Articles 3(1) and (4) of the 1979 Moon Treaty essentially reiterate
Article IV(2) of the 1967 Space Treaty. The only difference is that the
1979 Moon Treaty makes clear that "the enumerated prohibitions apply
to the moon no less than to all other celestial bodies within the solar sys-
tem apart from the earth." 1 Article 3(3), likewise, simply repeats the
1967 Space Treaty Article IV(l) with special reference to the moon.
Article 3(2) prohibits the threat or use of force or of hostile act on the
moon, or the use of the moon in order to commit any such acts or to en-
gage in any such threats in relation to "the earth, the moon, spacecraft,
the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects."2 2 This provision
is very similar to the principle set in Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.25 3
The Moon Treaty has been accepted by only a few states, none of
which is a significant space power.2 54 Therefore, the principles of the
1967 Space Treaty serve as the best guideline in determining the permis-
sible use of outer void space, the moon, and other celestial bodies.
D. Recent Developments
It is now generally accepted that many military uses are considered
by States to be both peaceful and lawful. State activities must remain
consistent with the established rules of customary international law. The
label of an activity, such as "peaceful," "military," or "non-military,"
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See CHENG, supra note 13, at 531.
250. Id. at 532.
251. Id. at 533.
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bears no weight on whether or not that activity is legal. Professor Christol
notes that the United States retains its inherent right to national self-
defense according to international law.2"' He explains that the United
States drew
a distinction between the exclusively beneficial and peaceful uses of
the Moon and other celestial bodies as contrasted with aggressive uses.
The distinction, then as well as now, assures a state the right to engage
in peaceful military activities in these limited areas. It may not engage
in aggressive military activities by the use of mass destruction or nu-
clear weapons in the space environment, nor may it engage in aggres-
sive military activities on the Moon or celestial bodies. 5
With this distinction clearly understood, states must abide by general in-
ternational law in their use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.
Today, debate continues over the definition of "peaceful," but it ap-
pears that the position that non-aggressive military uses are peaceful is
generally accepted. 7 Thus, "peaceful" has come to mean that as it is de-
scribed in the 1967 Moon Treaty: "general space activity that is beneficial
to and in the interests of all countries. 258
255. See CHRISTOL, supra note 23, at 37.
256. Id.





With the advent of the space age, debate began over the legal status
of terra nullius. This question has been further augmented by the ad-
vances in technology that have made the moon and other celestial bodies
easier to access. It has been established that the principle of the 1967
Space Treaty, that celestial bodies are free from appropriation by any
state, is now general international law. The concept that outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, belong to the "common
heritage of mankind", has not been accepted by the generality of states.
With the acceptance of the principle that celestial bodies are free from
territorial jurisdiction, states must take necessary steps to extend the rele-
vant parts of their national laws to outer space. It is imperative that states
realize their capacity to govern in light of jurisaction and jurisfaction, in
order that outer space does not become a lawless area.
The United Nations is likely to remain the main forum for the future
development of general international space law. The United Nations
should encourage states to agree upon a set boundary between airspace
and outer space. It is apparent that the space dominating states have used
their position to avert such a boundary. However, for development of
international space law, the locus over which the rules have effect must
be delineated.
As technology continues to develop, the need for law governing
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, becomes more
apparent. States cannot be free to do as they please-they must adhere to
guidelines in order for peace to be maintained. If states are going to ad-
here to space law, they must be able to identify it.
Although outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
is not regarded as common heritage of mankind, it must be treated as
such. While obeying the existing rules of general international law,
States must recognize the importance of working together for the benefit
of all. Many developments are yet to be achieved in the area of space
technology and states must ensure that these developments are for the
benefit, and not the detriment, of the world as a whole.
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